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WILLs-ExECuTIoN-Signature by testatrix in the attestation clause
does not satisfy statutory requirement of signature at the end thereof.
Knupp Estate,

-

Pa. -,

235 A.2d 585 (1967).

Testatrix drafted her own will on legal paper, entirely in her own handwriting, and disposing of her entire estate. After completing the body of
her will, she wrote out an attestation clause, leaving space for her own
name but not immediately inserting it. She then acknowledged to two competent witnesses that this was her last will and requested their signatures
as attestors. Testatrix then signed her name in the attestation clause after
the subscribing witnesses. The signature of the testatrix appeared only in
the very first line of the will and again in the attestation clause. Testatrix
then placed her will in an envelope, sealed it and wrote her name on the
envelope along with a statement that this was her last will. Proponents
of the will argued that a holographic will signed only in the attestation
clause is "signed at the end thereof" and that testatrix demonstrated
sufficient testamentary intent when document was signed, while the opponents of the will contended that testatrix's signature was not at the
"end" of the will.
Held: will was not signed by decedent at the end thereof and was not
a valid will. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision found
this case factually distinguishable from its decision in Miller Will' where
it held that testatrix's signature in the attestation clause of a printed
form will followed by the statement in the same clause that this was
"my" will was sufficient to satisfy Section 2 of the Wills Act of 19472
requiring wills to be signed at the end thereof.
Courts have long struggled with problems involving the interpretation
of the legal requisites necessary for proper execution of a will. A will has
been defined as "any instrument executed with the formalities of law,
whereby a person makes a disposition of his property to take effect after
his death."' The "formalities of law" referred to here were first set forth
in the English Statute of Frauds in 1677" requiring a will to be written,
signed by the testator and competently witnessed. After the Statute of
Frauds the signature of testator was necessary but its position was immaterial.' It was not until the English Wills Act of 1837 that the proper
location of the testator's authenticating signature was mandated to be
"at the foot or end thereof. .".."I Today while all American jurisdictions
1. 414 Pa. 385, 200 A.2d 284 (1964).
2. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 20, § 180.2 (1947).
3. 28 RULINc CASE LAW, 58 § 2.
4. 29 Chas. II, c. 3, V (1677).
S. Lemoyne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1 (C.P. 1681).
6. 7 Win. IV & I Vict., c. 26 § 9 (1837).
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require that a will be signed by testator or his proxy,
only twelve require
7
his signature to be at the end of the instrument.
The pertinent statutory provision in Pennsylvania establishing the
mandatory location for the testator's signature provides: "Every will
. . . shall be in writing and shall be signed by the testator at the end
thereof ....

,,I Although at first glance the language appears to be clear,

its exact meaning has involved considerable litigation, contrary to the
deceiving maxim cited by the majority in Knupp: "It [the statute] says
a will must be signed at the end thereof and that's the end of it."' The
"end" that the statute designates is not that point which is physically
furthest removed from the beginning of the will, but rather the logical or
sequential end of the instrument.' 0
The court in Knupp completely disregarded any consideration of
whether the testatrix intended to formalize her will by signing her name in
the attestation clause. "The question is not one of his intention, but of
what he actually did or rather what he failed to do.""- However, this
statement is inconsistent with this same court's decision in Miller where
testatrix also signed her name in the attestation clause and it was held
that "The remaining inquiry is: Did she (testatrix) intend this as her
testamentary signature or was she merely inserting her name for purposes
of identification? "12
The disputed attestation clause in Knupp reads:
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the above named
Testatrix, Montana 0. Knupp, as and for her Last Will and
Testament, in the presence of us, who at her request, and in the
presence of said Testatrix, and in the presence of each other,
have hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses thereto."
The approved attestation clause in Miller nearly duplicates that of Knupp
above:
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the above named
Clara Edna Miller as and for my last Will and Testament, in
7. CAL. PROB. CODE § 50(1) (West, 1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.07(1) (1964); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 14-303(1) (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-606 (1950); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 91.107(1) (1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-03-02 (1960); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2107.03 (Page, 1953); N.Y. DECED. EST. § 21(1) (1949); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 84,
§ 55(1) (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2 (1947) ; S.D. CODE § 56.0210 (1939); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 74-1-5 (1953).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 20, § 180.2 (1947).

9. Wineland's Appeal, 118 Pa. 37, 41, 12 A. 301, 302 (1888). (Paxson, J.).
10. Kehr's Will, 373 Pa. 473, 479, 95 A.2d 647, 650 (1953).
11. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 101, 103 A. 533, 537 (1918).

12. 414 Pa. at 390, 200 A.2d at 286.
13. 235 A.2d at 586.
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the presence of us, who have hereunto subscribed our names at
...... request as witnesses thereto in the presence of said
Testat.... and of each other (emphasis added)."
The entire will and attestation clause in Knupp were completely in the
handwriting of the testatrix whereas in Miller the will was a standard
printed form with a printed attestation clause at the bottom and the
only parts written by the testatrix were her signature and the word "my"
as above italicized.
In Miller the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
the instrument, on its face, reveals that decedent did intend to
affix and did affix her signature at the end of her testamentary
disposition when she wrote her name into the attestation clause.
Here the use of the pronoun "my" manifested a present intention that her signature serve as her testamentary signature....
(emphasis added)."
This is the very same intention of the testatrix that the instant court
refused to consider, stating that "the question in this case as to whether
decedent signed the writing at the end thereof is not one of decedent's
intention. . . ." (emphasis added).16 The court attempted to give some
credence to their rationale by factually distinguishing Miller from Knupp
by Miller's use of the word "my" in the attestation clause rather than
the word "her" used in Knupp. It is submitted that the employment of
the correct pronoun in an attestation clause hardly forms an adequate
basis for determination of whether an instrument is or is not a will.
The avowed purpose of the statutory necessity that a will be signed at
the end thereof is to remove all possibility of fraud and prevent "fraudulent or unauthorized alterations or additions to wills."' 7 The court sees
the problem as one of balancing the soundness of the legislative mandate
against the occasional thwarting of an expression of testamentary intent
for want of statutory complicity. However, it is difficult to reconcile
how the possibilities of fraud or a spurious will can be obviated by the
use of a certain pronoun as the court seems to suggest by refusing probate
in Knupp but not in Miller. Furthermore, if the reason for the statutory
requirement that a will be signed at the end is to minimize the possibility
of fraudulent alterations, there is no reason why blank space between
the body of the will and the signature sufficient to permit a fraudulent
addition should be regarded as immaterial to the validity of a will in
Pennsylvania. 8 Finally, the possibilities of fraud would appear to be even
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
results,

414 Pa. at 387, 200 A.2d at 285.
Id. at 390, 200 A.2d at 286.
Re Brown's Estate, 347 Pa. 244, 246, 32 A.2d 22, 23 (1943).
Id.
In Re Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 479 (1903). Other states have similar puzzling
e.g., Mader v. Apple, 80 Ohio St. 691, 89 N.E. 37 (1909) where the court allowed
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less in Knupp where the will was wholly holographic than in Miller
where the instrument was executed on a commercially printed form.
The decision reached in Knupp is consistent with the results of all other
cases in Pennsylvania involving wills in which the testator signed in the
attestation clause, 19 except Miller. Thus, in affirming the invalidity of the
Knupp will without definitely overruling Miller despite overwhelming
similarities in the two cases with only dissimilar pronouns in the attestation clauses, the court's position on the interpretation of "signed at the
end thereof" is untenable.
Justice Roberts, dissenting in Knupp, noted that the distinguishing
pronouns in both Knupp and Miller appear after testator's signature
and are therefore not considered part of the will so as to invalidate it."
Furthermore, he asserted that since there were no blank spaces between
the body of the will and the attestation clause in the Knupp will, there
was physically no room for any fraudulent additions prior to the signature, hence, the reason for the rule fails.2 ' Justice Roberts advocated
an examination of all the circumstances in each case to determine whether
the testator intended his signature in the attestation clause to formally
seal and end his testamentary dispositions, and would repeal both
Churchill's Estate2 and Glace Will" which held that signing in the attestation clause of a will does not meet the requirements of the Wills Act
of 1947 because it is not a signature at the end of the will.24
A survey of the jurisdictions having similar statutes requiring testator's signature to be at the end of the will reveals that the statutes are
usually very strictly construed so that both Miller and Knupp would
have been denied probate.25 However, the majority of states will admit
extrinsic evidence of the testator's declarations and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will to show testator's intent to sign
when the signature is not the end of the will. 6 Also, the Model Probate
Code27 and the Universal Wills Act28 provide no mandatory location for
the testator's signature.
probate of a will required to be signed at the end thereof notwithstanding a space of
23V2 inches between the body of the will and testator's signature.
19. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa. 94, 103 A. 533 (1918) ; Glace Will, 413 Pa. 91, 196 A.2d
297 (1964).
20. Griffith Will, 358 Pa. 474, 483 (1948); Beaumont's Estate, 216 Pa. 350 (1907).
21. 235 A.2d at 592.
22. 260 Pa. 94, 103 A. 533 (1918).
23. 413 Pa. 91, 196 A.2d 297 (1964).
24. 235 A.2d 585. Also, see supporting comment in 10 ViLL. L. REv. 196 (1964).
25. In re Bond's Estate, 159 Kan. 249, 153 P.2d 912 (1944) ; In re Moore's Estate, 206
P.2d 413, 192 C.A.2d 120 (1949) ; In re Baur's Estate, 79 N.D. 113, 54 N.W.2d 891 (1952);
In re Alexander's Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139 P.2d 432 (1943).
26. Meades v. Earle, 205 Mass. 553, 91 N.E. 916 (1910); Ex Parte Cardoza, 135 Md.
407, 109 A. 95 (1919) ; In re Norris Estate, 221 Mich. 430, 191 N.W. 238 (1922).
27. Simes and Basye, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 47-8 (1946).
28. 43 A.B.A.J. 139 (1957).
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It is submitted that the most rational and enlightened solution for the
problem in Knupp would be that where there is a clear showing of testamentary intent and absent any suggestion of fraud, a substantial compliance with the statute should be sufficient, 29 rather than a blind obliteration of an otherwise valid dispository scheme for failure to sign on the
proper line or for the misfortune of using the incorrect pronoun. The
decision in Knupp represents a recognition of the immateriality of testamentary intent to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and a regression to
honoring artificial barriers of form.
Daniel P. Ste ko
29. Matter of Case, 126 Misc. 704, 214N.Y.S. 678 (1926) ; In re Bragg's Estate, 76 P.2d
57 (1938); In re Free's Estate, 181 OkIa. 564, 75 P.2d 476 (1938).

